From their words and actions it was easy to doubt their intentions to lead. After they did everything to betray their claims, finally, presidential candidates under CPC did something to show they are serious about their candidature.
Often times the presidential candidates had acted in ways to suggest that they were never interested not sure of themselves taking the mantle of Somali leadership. This is to say, “what would you president about if, in your opposition days, you did everything to undermine and emasculate the presidency of whatever little authority it had?”
To put it into context, here are some of the positions or decisions that portrayed the opposition candidates as though they were not serious about running for and winning the presidency:
1. Endlessly called for international intervention against the federal government leadership. Criticized FGS protest actions against UN and international actors. Sheikh Sharif and Hassan Sheikh may know everything about SRSGs behaving badly— acting like the president’s president. How SRSGs, especially Mahiga and Nick Kay and their minions of advisors like Nurdin Dirie, Abdirahman Abdishakur and Noboru proved such a pain in the ass for his administration through their insubordination, condescending attitude, patronizing actions. Ordinarily, any presidential candidate, Sheikh Sharif and Hasan Sheikh in particular, should be commending and thankful of Farmaajo’s getting back Somali authority, and sovereignty generally, from the grip of SRSG and foreign embassies. That they should draw a line to where Farmaajo pushed the boundary and aspire to extend and not distend it should anyone of them occupy the presidency in the next elections, if at all they are held.
2. Blatantly supported FMS aggressive political and security postures against the FGS. If it wasn’t for Abdi Hashi’s incessant nagging and for the military intervention of CPC, Farmaajo would have been home and dry for an extension and a second term there after. But if after 10 Farmajo years any of the CPC members became president, he would have inherited what would have been a full presidency that would have accorded them full internal control. Unless proven otherwise by Farmaajo’s further misbehavior, CPC would be forever guilty of arresting or standing the the way of a Somalia take off brought forward.
3. Called on and intimidated the security forces to be neutral and disobey civilian, command and control authority.
4. Condoned or outright expressed support for non-state armed actors such as ASWJ, Janan, Matt Bryden and Robow against the FGS.
5. Singled out Qatar for exaggerated criticism and outlandish attacks. This without the guarantee that it’s rivals (supposedly not any more) would have more utility than a three-days old crescent/new moon.
6. Publicly supported controversial executive decisions of a prime minister against a president.
7. Blackmailed and intimidated NISA, especially on decisions that touch on security and internal management. Presidential candidates with the prospect to become a president shouldn’t go about curtailing state institutions that he might end up inheriting.
8. Showed vigorous opposition to FGS regional foreign policy and in essence sanctioned or appeared to sanction foreign interference of Somalia’s internal affairs. “Ninkii abeesa koroyow adigaa u aayee.”
9. In all, CPC had been going after Farmaajo and castigating him for all the wrong reasons, all the while leaving him scot free on his real flaws and the real faults of his administration.
All the above positions would amount to what a Somali would called “cutting the udder of the gestating she camel that one was poised to inherit just before it gives birth to start enjoying its milk.”
Until, suddenly, CPC found their footing and started showing and acting as though they were dead serious about leading this country. It came unplanned by way of their meeting with AUPSC delegation in Mogadishu in November, when they surprised the delegation with their opposition to hybrid AU-UN post-AMISOM security mandate in Somalia. The candidates categorically voiced their opposition to anything to do with mandate change and reintroduction of UN Chapter VII. As a stopgap measure CPC asked for a moratorium to put a halt to any decision on post-2021 Somalia security in order to accord the next administration the opportunity to make informed decisions on Somalia future security and to avoid being bogged down in a process and decision they knew little or nothing about before talking office.
It’s to be expected that, politics a side, Tuuyare, Sanbaloolshe, Bashiir Goobe, Gaafow (I don’t think Gafow would give a hoot. After all, didn’t he save Qalbidhagax from TPLF assassination in the most dramatic and heroic way that’s unknown to most and downplayed by ones in the know?), Ahmed Fiqi (well, I think Fiqi is an exception because he showed some serious commitment to the job from the onset and he’s remembered for his ruthless approach against Al-Shabab before he was fired under controversial circumstances pointing to the same reasons.) and everyone that ever led or held a top position in NISA is secretly admiring, or maybe envying, how Fahad has played, and is still playing, the game — since he remains as a de facto NISA chief.
If Matt Bryden,— an erstwhile critique and public enemy #1 of Fahad because of the extent he goes to incriminate and set him against Western and Horn of Africa security operatives by painstakingly painting an exaggerated profile of him— could not conceal the fact of Fahad transforming NISA, then the assumption about his predecessors’ reaction to his performance rings true.
If not for anything else, Farmaajo deserves kudos (which all candidates secretly commend him about) for crewing up Matt Bryden and giving him a run for his money. Living him unhinged to the extent that he’s left blaming Somalia’s Western international partners for failing to join him in his personal fight against FGS leaders.
In sum, with all their individual shortcomings, a Somali will always vouch for Somalia as soon as the predicament or need that he finds himself leaves him. CPC could and FMS leaders could make do with any kind of support from anyone who can offer, but none of them will compromise Somalia’s core interests when they get to where they want. Therefore, Matt Bryden can support the opposition with all the English English he can write but that won’t be enough to salvage him from the damage that Farmaajo dealt him.
It’s along this line that CPC position to support the FGS’s position against AUPSC resolution to have hybrid AU-UN peace enforcement, under Chapter VII of the UN charter, replace AMISOM — post-2021. This CPC decision that came as a surprise to AUPSC delegation is ironically what confirmed that individual members of the CPC are indeed very serious in their bid to unseat and take over from Farmaajo.
By: Aydid Guled